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Abstract 
 
We investigate quantitative implications of precautionary demand for money for business cycle 
dynamics of velocity and other nominal aggregates. Accounting for such dynamics is a standing challenge 
in monetary macroeconomics: standard business cycle models that have incorporated money have failed 
to generate realistic predictions in this regard. In those models, the only uncertainty affecting money 
demand is aggregate. We investigate a model with uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty about liquidity 
need and find that the resulting precautionary motive for holding money produces substantial qualitative 
and quantitative improvements in accounting for business cycle behavior of nominal variables, at no cost 
to real variables. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study, theoretically and quantitatively, aggregate business cycle implications of
precautionary demand for money. It is an outstanding challenge in the literature to account for
business cycle behavior of nominal aggregates and their interaction with real aggregates. Business
cycle models that have tried to incorporate money explicitly through, for example, cash-in-advance
constraints, have done so while assuming that agents face only aggregate risk, which has resulted in
the demand for money being largely deterministic, in the sense that the cash-in-advance constraint
almost always binds. Such models have unrealistic implications for the dynamics of nominal vari-
ables, as well as for interaction between real and nominal variables, when compared to data (see,
e.g., Cooley and Hansen, 1995).
Yet precautionary motive for holding liquidity seems to be strong in the data, and its nature
suggests that idiosyncratic risk may play a key role for money demand, as shown in Telyukova
(2011). In that paper, it is documented that the median household has about 50% more liquidity
than it spends on average per month, and that controlling for observables, consumption of goods
requiring a liquid payment method (e.g. cash or check) exhibits volatility consistent with the
presence of signicant idiosyncratic risk. Thus, aggregate implications of idiosyncratic risk and
resulting precautionary money demand are important to investigate, especially given the unre-
solved questions regarding monetary business cycles. The goal of this paper is to conduct such an
investigation. The set of questions we want to answer is: What are the aggregate implications of
precautionary demand for money? Can it help account for business cycle dynamics of velocity of
money, interest rates and ination, and their interaction with real variables?
Existing monetary business cycle models that incorporate money demand via a cash-in-advance
constraint, such as cash-credit good models, calibrated to aggregate data, cannot account for ag-
gregate facts such as variability of velocity of money, correlation of velocity with output growth
or money growth, correlation of ination with nominal interest rates, and others, as Hodrick,
Kocherlakota and Lucas (1991) have shown. The reason is that in such models, the only type of
uncertainty the households face is aggregate uncertainty. The magnitude of this uncertainty in
the data is not large enough to generate signicant precautionary motive for holding money in the
model, so that the cash-in-advance constraint almost always binds. Then, money demand in the
model is made equivalent to cash-good consumption, tightly linking volatility of money demand to
volatility of aggregate consumption. Aggregate consumption, in turn, is not volatile enough in the
data to generate observed volatility of money demand (or its inverse, velocity) or other nominal
aggregates.
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We show that incorporating precautionary demand for money generated by unpredictable id-
iosyncratic variation, in combination with aggregate uncertainty, makes a crucial dierence in the
ability of the model to account for monetary facts mentioned above, by breaking the link between
money demand and aggregate consumption. Agents generally hold more money than they spend,
so that money demand is now linked only to consumption of agents whose preference shock re-
alizations make them spend all of their money in trade. We show that velocity of money can be
signicantly more volatile in this heterogeneous-agent setting, thanks to the unconstrained agents,
who are absent in previous models with only aggregate risk. The presence of both constrained and
unconstrained households is key to the qualitative and quantitative results. In other words, id-
iosyncratic risk in this context does not average out in a way that can be adequately captured
by a representative agent model, as Hodrick et al (1991) in fact anticipated in the discussion of
their results (p. 380). In addition, the magnitude of idiosyncratic volatility is much higher than
aggregate volatility: the standard deviation of aggregate consumption is 0.5%; we will measure the
standard deviation of idiosyncratic consumption shocks to be around 19%.
Introducing idiosyncratic risk into the model also changes the nature of the ination tax, and
thus has an impact on welfare costs of ination. In the standard cash-credit good model with
only aggregate risk, where the cash-in-advance constraint in practice always binds, the cost to
agents of having a positive nominal interest rate is in having to hold money to spend on the cash
good. In standard cash-credit good models as in our model, the nominal interest rate drives a
wedge between the marginal rate of transformation and the marginal rate of substitution between
cash and credit goods.1 Without idiosyncratic shocks, this wedge aects all households equally:
taken as given the total of cash goods transacted, the allocation among households equates the
marginal utilities among households. Once we add uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, not only is the
total quantity of goods in the cash market suboptimal with ination, but the allocation of this
quantity among households is also inecient: it does not equate the household's marginal utilities
in the cash market. The agents whose idiosyncratic shock realization is binding have a marginal
utility is higher than that of the unconstrained agents, and thus, ex post, bear more of the cost of
ination. We show in our setting that this raises the cost of ination. The nature of the ination
tax in the model with idiosyncratic risk also depends on whether ination increases are anticipated
or not. In the latter case, as we show in our welfare analysis, a surprise increase in ination can
further exacerbate this last distortion.
1In our model, the timing is such that it is the rms who take cash from one period to the next, after selling the
cash goods. Whether discounting occurs before or after the cash market, however, is immaterial for the wedge between
marginal rate of transformation and marginal rate of substitution. Given free entry of rms, the full incidence of the
ination tax is still born by the households.
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We study these mechanisms qualitatively and quantitatively in a model that combines, in each
period, two types of markets in a sequential manner, and where both aggregate and idiosyncratic
uncertainty are present. The rst-subperiod market is a standard Walrasian market, which we will
term, somewhat loosely, the \credit market". The second market is also competitive, but charac-
terized by anonymity and the absence of barter possibility, which makes a medium of exchange -
money - essential in trade. We term this market the \cash market".2 The credit market is much
like a standard real business cycle model, with the production function being subject to aggregate
productivity shocks. Two features distinguish this market from the RBC framework. First, house-
holds have to decide how much money to carry out of this market for future cash consumption.
Second, part of the output in the credit market is carried into the cash market by retail rms,
who buy these goods on credit and subsequently transform them into cash goods. This introduces
an explicit link between the real and monetary sectors of the economy, as credit-market capital
becomes indirectly productive in the cash market.
At the start of the second-subperiod cash market, agents are subject to uninsurable idiosyn-
cratic preference shocks which determine how much of the cash good they want to consume, but the
realization of the shock is not known at the time that agents make their portfolio decisions. This
generates precautionary motive for holding liquidity. In our model, we show analytically how the
idiosyncratic shocks, and the resulting heterogeneity of households, result in amplied dynamics of
velocity of money. We also show that absent idiosyncratic shocks, the model produces counterfac-
tual nominal dynamics for values of the coecient of relative risk aversion in the standard range
in RBC literature.
Another contribution of our work is the calibration of the model. To our knowledge, all the
existing models of the types mentioned above that have looked at aggregate behavior of nominal
variables have been calibrated to aggregate data. Instead, we also use micro survey data on liquid
consumption from the Consumption Expenditure Survey, like in Telyukova (2011), to calibrate
idiosyncratic preference risk in our cash market. In general, preference risk of the type that creates
precautionary liquidity demand has not been measured in calibration of other aggregate models,
and in the few contexts where precautionary liquidity demand has appeared, it has been treated
as a free parameter (e.g. Faig and Jerez, 2007). Our use of micro data tightly disciplines our
calibration.
2This setup is consistent with both cash-credit good models a la Lucas and Stokey (1987) and monetary search
models in the style of Lagos and Wright (2005). In theory, money-search-style idiosyncratic matching shocks could be
interpreted as a type of idiosyncratic preference shock (Wallace 2001). However, with matching shocks, agents spend
all or none of their money, while a crucial part of our argument is that a preference shock may cause a household
to spend only part of their money holdings. The natural empirical counterparts of the two types of shocks are also
dierent.
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Once calibrated, we compute the model to investigate the eects of real productivity shocks
and monetary policy shocks. We nd that precautionary demand for money makes a dramatic
dierence in helping the model account for a variety of dynamic moments of nominal aggregates
in the data. We test these results by also computing a version of the model where we shut down
the idiosyncratic risk, and nd that without it, the model is incapable of reproducing key nominal
moments in the data, much as previous literature has suggested.
Our results lead us to conclude that in many monetary contexts, especially those aimed at
accounting for aggregate data facts, it is important not to omit idiosyncratic uncertainty that
gives rise to precautionary demand for money. As one example, omitting this empirically relevant
mechanism may cause the standard practice of calibrating monetary models to the aggregate money
demand equation, as has been done in many cash-in-advance models and monetary search models,
to produce misleading results for parameters and counterfactual quantitative implications. We
demonstrate this by calibrating a version of the model without idiosyncratic shocks to target some
data properties of aggregate money demand.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. On the topic of precautionary demand
for liquidity,3 the key mechanism in our model is close to Faig and Jerez (2007), Telyukova and
Wright (2008) and Telyukova (2011). In Telyukova and Wright (2008) and Telyukova (2011), the
idiosyncratic uncertainty about liquidity need is shown, respectively theoretically and quantita-
tively, to be relevant for household portfolio decisions to hold liquid assets and credit card debt
simultaneously. Faig and Jerez (2007) look at the behavior of velocity and nominal interest rates
over the long run. They nd that with precautionary liquidity demand, the simulated time series of
velocity over the last century, interpreted as a series of steady states, ts the empirical series well.
Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) study steady state properties of a monetary economy with idiosyn-
cratic preference shocks.4 On the broad subject of accounting for aggregate behavior of nominal
variables, a recent paper is Wang and Shi (2006). In their model, however, search intensity is the
key mechanism behind velocity uctuations over the business cycle.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and characterizes the equi-
librium. Section 3 demonstrates analytically the impact of precautionary demand for money on
3The subject of precautionary money demand goes back to at least Keynes(1936), who dened its reason as \to
provide for contingencies requiring sudden expenditure and for unforeseen opportunities of advantageous purchases".
Precautionary demand for money is often modeled in Baumol-Tobin-style inventory-theoretic models, from Whalen
(1966) to fully dynamic stochastic models such as Alvarez and Lippi (2009). Uninsurable idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks are also an essential element of models based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Lucas (1980) studies the
equilibrium in a cash-in-advance model with precautionary demand for money.
4In another paper on the broad subject of precautionary money demand, Hagedorn (2008) shows that strong
liquidity eects can arise when precautionary demand for money is taken into account in a cash-credit good model
with banking.
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the dynamic behavior of money, velocity and interest rates, and discusses the ination tax further.
Section 4 describes our calibration strategy for several versions of the model. In section 5 we
present our results and discuss the quantitative role of precautionary liquidity demand; we then
discuss how omission of precautionary demand may lead model calibration and implications astray.
In section 6 we show how precautionary demand aects welfare costs of ination, both anticipated
and unanticipated. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
The economy is populated by a measure 1 of innitely-lived households, who rent labor and capital
to rms, consume goods bought from the rms, and save. There are two types of markets open
sequentially during the period. In the rst subperiod, a Walrasian market is open, in which all
parties involved in transactions are known and all trades can be enforced. In the second subperiod,
the market is competitive, in the sense that all agents are price takers, but we assume that money
is essential in trade.5 Since in the rst-subperiod market households pay with either cash or credit
for consumption, and as we discuss below, retail rms buy on credit, we will refer to this as the
\credit market",6 while the second subperiod - where payment takes place using money only - will
be termed the \cash market".
There are two types of rms in the economy. Production rms use capital and labor as inputs in
production, and their output is used for consumption and capital investment in the credit market.
However, part of the output is also bought in the credit market by retail rms, who then transform
the goods one-for-one into retail goods to be sold in the cash market.7
2.1 Households
Households maximize lifetime expected discounted utility,
E0
"
1X
t=0
t

U(ct)  Aht + #tu(q#;t)
#
(1)
5Temzelides and Yu (2004) derive sucient conditions under which money is essential in competitive markets.
See also Levine (1991) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
6In the data, credit cards are a complex arrangement that for some households is a convenience device, while for
others, a long-term revolving credit arrangement. Our credit market is a simplication, and not meant to capture
credit cards tightly; however, we believe it to be the most natural simplication, and we will use survey data to
discipline cash consumption as goods which cannot be paid by credit.
7Our retailers are not meant to correspond one-for-one to the retail sector in the data: some retailers in the data
are better characterized as selling in the credit market, whereas the cash sector includes rms that are not retailers.
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where 0 <  < 1. While here for analytical tractability we assume that the utility function is
separable, in computation we examine cases with both separable and CES utility functions.8 Inada
conditions on U() and u() ensure that consumers participate in both markets. Utility achieved in
each period, depends on consumption ct and time spent working ht 2 [0; 1] in the rst subperiod,
and in the second subperiod, consumption qt and the preference shock #t. First-subperiod utility
follows the Hansen-Rogerson specication of indivisible labor with lotteries. The taste shock #t is
realized when the credit market is already closed and money holdings can no longer be adjusted,
as described below. This will lead to precautionary demand for money.
We normalize household money holdings and nominal bond holdings by the aggregate money
holdings, rendering them stationary. Households start the period with normalized money holdings
mt and choose ~mt normalized money to bring into the cash market, before #t occurs. Households
also own capital kt and normalized nominal bonds bt sold to them by retail rms, as detailed
below.9 Let wage, capital rent, and the return on nominal bonds be wt; rt; it 1. Let the nominal
price of the credit good be pt. The budget constraint, expressed in nominal terms, is
mt + (1 + rt   )ptkt + wtptht + bt(1 + it 1) = ptct + ~mt + ptkt+1 + bt+1 (2)
We will later employ ffit = 1=pt to denote the value of one unit of money in terms of the credit
good, in order to rewrite the budget constraint in real terms. Given nominal price  t of the cash
good, consumption q#;t in the cash market, conditional on the preference shock realization #t, has
to satisfy  tq#;t  ~mt:
2.2 Firms
The problem of the production rm is standard { to maximize its prots in each period. Given a
constant returns to scale production function yt = e
ztf(kt; ht), where zt is stochastic productivity
level, the problem is: maxkt;ht

eztf(kt; ht)   wtht   rtktg. The solution is characterized by the
usual rst-order conditions.
Retail rms exist for two periods: they buy the goods in the credit market, selling nominal
bonds to households to do so, sell the goods in the subsequent cash market, and settle their debt in
the following credit market, before disbanding. Free entry in the retail market yields the following
8Given that the leisure component of utility is linear, results along the same lines as presented go through for the
CES case, at some notational cost.
9In principle, households can hold shares of rms as well. We will see that in our formulation all rms make zero
prots, share holding is irrelevant. Alternatively, we can formulate the economy with rms selling shares instead of
bonds; this leads to equivalent allocations of resources, but involves more notation.
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condition, expressed in nominal terms at time t:
rt = max
qt

 tqt
1 + it
 
qt
ffit

= 0: (3)
All cash receipts from retail sales go towards repayment in the following credit market; the value
of this repayment is discounted using the nominal interest rate. The repayment equals the current
nominal value for the qt goods that were purchased in the credit market by the retailers. Since the
cash market is competitive, retail rms sell all their goods in equilibrium.10
2.3 Monetary Policy and Aggregate Shocks
The monetary authority follows an interest rate feedback rule
1 + it+1
1 +i
=

1 + it
1 +i
ii 1 + t
1 + 
i yt
y
iy
exp("
mp
t+1): (4)
The variables with bars denote central bank's long-run target levels of output, ination and the
nominal interest rate. The term "
mp
t denotes a stochastic monetary policy shock which is realized
at the beginning of period t. At the end of the period, the government makes a lump sum transfer
$tMt, where Mt is the aggregate money stock. The rate of money supply growth $t is adjusted
by the central bank to make it arise as the equilibrium price.
The second, independent, aggregate shock process is on the productivity level zt. As is standard
in business cycle literature, zt follows an AR(1) of the form zt+1 = zzzt + "
z
t+1.
2.4 Recursive Formulation of the Household Problem
From now on, we will conserve notation by omitting time subscripts, and using primes to denote t+
1. The aggregate state variables in this economy are S = (K; z; i 1; i; (1+$ 1)ffi 1): the aggregate
capital stock, the technology shock, previous interest rate in the economy, current interest rate,
and the previous period's post-injection real value of money, which households need to determine
the current rate of ination. The individual state variables at the beginning of the credit market
are (m;k; b): normalized money holdings, capital and bond holdings. We take the credit good as
the numeraire. The household solves
10We assume that goods are storable, so even at zero expected real interest rate, this is without loss of generality.
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V (k;m; b; S) = max
c;h; ~m;k0;b0;fq#g

U(c)  Ah (5)
+E#

#u(q#) + Ez0;i0V (k
0;m0;
b0
1 +$
;S0)
ff
s.t. c+ ffi ~m+ k0 + ffib0 = ffim+ ffib(1 + i 1) + (1 + r   )k + wh (6)
 q#  ~m (7)
 =
(1 +$ 1)ffi 1
ffi
(8)
1 +$ = 
(S) (9)
m0 =
~m
1 +$
 
 q#
1 +$
+
$
1 +$
(10)
z0 = zzz + "
0
1 (11)
(1^ + i0) = ii(]1 + i) + i~ + iy ~y + "
0
2 (12)
The interest rate rule here is given in short hand, with ~x referring to log-deviations of the variable
x from its target level. Denote the household state variables as s = (k;m; b). Denote the policy
functions of the household's problem by g(s; S), with gx(:) as the policy function for the choice
variable x.
Definition 1. A Symmetric Stationary Monetary Equilibrium is a set of pricing functions
ffi(S),  (S), w(S), r(S); law of motion K 0(S), value function V (s; S) and policy functions
gc(s; S), gh(s; S), gk(s; S), gb(s; S), gm(s; S), fgq;#(s; S)g, all #, such that: (i) households opti-
mize by solving (5), given prices and laws of motion; (ii) production and retail rms optimize,
as in section 2.2; (iii) free entry of retailers implies r = 0; (iv) the aggregate law of mo-
tion follows from the sum of all individual decisions: K 0(S) =
R 1
0 g
i
k(s; S)di. Finally, (v) all
markets clear:Z 1
0
gim(s; S)di = 1Z 1
0
ffi(S)gib(s; S)di =
Z 1
0
h
E#g
i
q;#(s; S)
i
diZ 1
0
gih(s; S)di = H(S)
(1  )K + ezf(H(S);K) =
Z 1
0
gic(s; S)di+K
0(S) +
Z 1
0
h
E#g
i
q;#(s; S)
i
di
In appendix A we derive and analyze the equilibrium conditions of the problem, to show that
the quasi-linear specication of the utility function allows equilibria in which the distribution of
wealth created by the idiosyncratic shocks in the cash market washes out in the following credit
market, as long as h remains in the interior. The following result is immediate:
Result 1. The choice of c; ~m;k0; b0 only depends on the aggregate states S.
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Further, we show that for low enough realizations of the shock #, cash balances are not spent
in full, and that the resulting q# is the ecient quantity that equalizes the marginal utilities of
credit- and cash-good consumption. In contrast, if a shock #^ results in a binding cash constraint,
then for any # > #^, the constraint will also bind, which will lead to the underconsumption of the
cash good relative to social optimum.
What does this say about consumer payment behavior? In the data, it is reasonable to expect
that dierent consumers make dierent choices with respect to how much to consume with cash
versus credit. In our model, the cash market is meant to capture transactions which cannot be
paid using credit, as we will discuss in the calibration section. However, the \credit" market in the
rst subperiod is more exible: the model is silent on whether households pay using credit or cash,
as these methods can be costlessly transferred one into the other. Thus the model implicitly can
accommodate the kind of heterogeneity in portfolios and payment methods seen in the data. In
order to discipline our model, we will, in calibration, match the total volume of consumer transac-
tions done by liquid payment methods (cash, check, debit) in aggregate data. Since the dynamics
we want to explain are of aggregate variables, individual heterogeneity in payment methods will
not aect them beyond getting the transaction shares right.
3 Idiosyncratic Uncertainty and Nominal Dynamics
In this section, we demonstrate analytically that there are at least three ways in which idiosyncratic
shocks to cash-good preferences can improve the quantitative performance of the model. First, the
dynamic behavior of the value of money and prices varies signicantly with the probability that
the marginal dollar is spent, i.e. that the cash constraint binds. As a result, the model with
idiosyncratic shocks can accommodate values of the relative risk aversion (RRA) parameter in the
standard RBC calibration range (ff 2 [1; 4]), whereas the model without shocks would require ff < 1
to produce realistic dynamics of prices. Second, part of velocity uctuation is now generated in the
cash market, thus increasing the overall magnitude of velocity volatility, and velocity now depends
in an intuitive way on nominal interest rates. Third, the standard general-equilibrium substitution
channel in cash-credit good models between cash and credit good consumption is now dampened,
because cash consumption will now only adjust for the binding realization of the shock. Most
proofs of our results in this section are in appendix B.
3.1 Dynamic Behavior of Real Balances
The dynamic behavior of money will be an essential input for relating velocity to interest rates. It is
also, however, empirically relevant in itself: one uncontroversial empirical regularity is the degree
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of persistence of interest rates, prices, and real balances, before and after detrending, over the
business cycle. Nominal interest rates have an autocorrelation at quarterly frequency of 0.932; for
real balances, it is 0.951.11 It seems a minimal requirement that a monetary business cycle model
can replicate the sign of these autocorrelations. This requirement turns out to have important
implications for the range of the RRA parameter admissible in calibration.
For the sake of exposition, assume two preference shock realizations #i, where #h leads to a
binding cash constraint, and #l to a nonbinding constraint.
12 We write p for the probability of the
high shock #h. Note that if we set p = 1, we are back to the case with no idiosyncratic shocks. We
temporarily simplify the utility function in the credit market to be fully linear, U(c) = c. To study
the dynamics of real balances, we rework equilibrium conditions (29) to derive the relationship
between real balances today ffi and expected real balances tomorrow gEffi0  E hffi0(S0)1+$ U 0(c0)U 0(c) i:
ffi = p#hu
0(gEffi0)gEffi0 + (1  p)gEffi0; (13)
This means that the real value of one unit of money, is a weighted averages of the value in use
of the marginal unit of money, for which the need only arises with probability p, and the value
when this unit not used, and carried over to the next period. Because of the normalization by the
aggregate money stock, this equals aggregate real balances.
Lemma 1. The elasticity of real balances today with respect to real balances tomorrow eval-
uated at an equilibrium ffi; gEffi0, is given by
"
ffi;fEffi0 =

1 
1  p
1 + i

(1  ff) +
1  p
1 + i
: (14)
Because of the positive second term on the RHS of (14), the elasticity of real balances today
with respect to real balances tomorrow is brought closer to 1, and hence the demand for money
is smoothened.13 Real balances tomorrow in part determine directly real balances today, because
with probability (1   p) the marginal unit of money is not used. Consider the case without
idiosyncratic shocks, where the cash constraint always binds (p = 1). The value of the marginal unit
of money when it needs to spent, depends on the households' aversion to intertemporally varying
consumption, captured by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (i.e.s). Lower real balances
tomorrow imply that that the value of one unit of money is less in today's cash market, but less
goods overall can be bought, raising the marginal utility. To be precise, when the cash constraint
11BP-ltered, nominal interest rate from three-month treasury bonds, real money balances from M2 and the GDP
deator (source: FRED2).
12In general, as i increases, more of the shock realizations may lead to a binding cash constraint; here, for exposition,
we assume that only the high shock binds throughout. Generically, for small enough uctuations in i, this assumption
will hold. We will relax it in computation.
13Real balances today and tomorrow are measured here in the same units.
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binds, q equals gEffi0; this implies that the value of bringing one more unit of money when it is used
to purchase cash consumption, is u0(gEffi0)gEffi0. With an elasticity of substitution between zero and
one, i.e. ff > 1, households are adverse enough to variation in consumption that, when real balances
tomorrow are expected to decrease, the marginal utility rises so much that the value of money and
hence, real balances today will increase, leading to a negative autocorrelation of real balances.
To avoid such counterfactual behavior of monetary variables in the setting without idiosyncratic
shocks, one has to make households less averse to consumption uctuations (0 < ff < 1). This,
however, will imply an intertemporal elasticity of subsitution that is nonstandard in business cycle
modeling, leading to too strong responses of real variables to real shocks, e.g. technology shocks.
With idiosyncratic preference shocks, one does not have not make this unattractive choice
between counterfactual monetary outcomes, or counterfactual outcomes on the real side. The
proportional response of real balances today to foreseen changes in real balances tomorrow, is once
again an average of the response when the marginal unit of money is not used and when this
unit is spent, weighted now by 1 p1+i and (1 
1 p
1+i ) respectively, as shown in lemma 1. This means
that households can be more averse to uctuations in cash good consumption (conditional on the
realization of the idiosyncratic shock), while preserving the highly positive autocorrelation of real
balances. Lower real balances tomorrow can raise the value of an extra unit of money when the
household does face a binding cash constraint, but when it is suciently likely that an additional
dollar is unused and carried over to the next period, this would only work to dampen uctuations
in real balances, rather than create negative autocorrelations.14
3.2 Dynamic Behavior of Velocity
Denote by C aggregate consumption within a period. The consumption and output velocities of
money in the above example with two idiosyncratic shocks can be written as
Vc =
PC
M
=
c
ffi
+ (1  p)
ql(1 + i)
ffi
+ p
qh(1 + i)
ffi
Vy =
PY
M
=
(y   (1  p)ql   pqh)
ffi
+ (1  p)
ql(1 + i)
ffi
+ p
qh(1 + i)
ffi
Let us look at consumption velocity. Observe that, as in standard cash-in-advance and cash-
credit-good models, the constrained part of the cash market always contributes 1 to the level of
consumption velocity, and nothing to velocity uctuations, because qh(1+i)
ffi
= 1. Thus, if p = 1,
then all velocity movement has to come from the credit market - i.e. from c or ffi. Instead, in our
14In our calibration, we will have a nominal interest rate rule with persistence. In a setting with p = 1 and ff > 1,
persistence in the nominal interest rate could be achieved by alternating expansions and contractions of the money
supply. Again, this would be counterfactual.
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model, velocity uctuations are also created in the cash market, thanks to the low shocks where
the cash constraint does not bind.15
One can also see this by looking at marginal rates of substitution between cash and credit
market consumption. The MRS for the binding and non-binding cases is
#hu
0(qh)
U 0(c)
= 1 +
i
p
(15)
#hu
0(qh)
U 0(c)
= 1; (16)
(which implies E#[
#u0(qh)
U 0(c) ] = 1 + i). Without preference shocks (p = 1), cash market consumption
thus always depends on nominal interest rates, as in (15). Preference shocks add agents who are
not constrained (p < 1), and whose cash market consumption does not depend on i, as in (16).
Having arrived in the cash market, money holdings are predetermined, and households trade o
spending a dollar in the cash market versus spending it next credit market. Given competitive
pricing by retail rms', this results in an undistorted consumption allocation of unconstrained
agents. Unconstrained agents do not adjust their consumption in response to changes in i, but
in response to price changes, they adjust their money spending, and hence they contribute to
uctuations in velocity. Constrained agents respond to price changes through consumption, but
the total amount of money spent does not move.
This analysis also sheds light on the nature of the ination tax, relative to the standard cash-
credit good model. Without preference shocks, money is costly to hold whenever the nominal
interest rate is positive, and the wedge in the MRS (15) aects everyone equally. With preference
shocks, the MRS of the unconstrained agents implies that their allocation is optimal. Thus, in
terms of allocations, the ination tax is borne only by the constrained agents, who ex ante, given
a positive cost of insurance against preference shocks, opt to insure themselves only partially
against the realization of high shocks. For a given level of q supplied by retailers, one can see
an additional distortion, because the marginal utility of constrained households is higher than
that of the unconstrained households, whereas a planner constrained only by q would equate these
marginal utilities across preference shock realizations, like in the no-shock case. For the constrained
agents, the cost of ination is higher than the average in the no-shock model. We will evaluate the
quantitative implications of this in the Welfare section.
Returning to velocity dynamics, the elasticity of consumption velocity with respect to i can be
15Models with variable search intensity also create velocity uctuations in the cash market (Wang and Shi 2006).
Standard search models with xed match probabilities do not.
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divided into credit-market and cash-market components:
"Vc;1+i = sc("c;1+i   "ffi;1+i) + scash, nb  " ;1+i; (17)
where sc is the share of the credit good in total consumption expenditure, and scash;nb is the share
of cash consumption under non-binding preference shocks.
Lemma 2. Elasticity of the cash market price with respect to the interest rate is always
positive, and is given by
" ;1+i = " 1+i
ffi
;1+i =
1 + i
ff(p+ i)
> 0: (18)
Thus, the less risk-averse the household is, or the smaller the probability of a binding constraint
is, the more of the velocity uctuations originate in the cash market, ceteris paribus.
To conclude our analytical discussion, we now incorporate fully the response of credit-good
consumption c to changes in prices and interest rates. To do this, we drop the linearity assumption
on U(c); this adds a general-equilibrium feedback eect linking nominal interest rates and velocity,
through substitution between cash and credit goods. The only assumption that we need for ana-
lytical tractability here is that capital is constant; while this shuts down one equilibrium eect, it
does not alter the other eects that we focus on.16
Proposition 1. The implicit elasticity of consumption velocity with respect to the nominal
interest rate, caused by a one-time fully anticipated money injection (in addition to the
constant rate of money growth consistent with a given steady state level of 1 + i), is
"Vc;1+i = sc

1
ff
1 + i
p+ i
  1

+ scash;nb

1 + i
p+ i
 
1
"U 0(c);qh + ff
!
(19)
This elasticity is an equilibrium object: it tells us how the nominal interest rate and velocity vary
when both variables move as a result of a one-time fully anticipated money injection.
Proof. For this proof, we redene next period's real balances as gEffi0  EU 0(c0)ffi0=(1 +$). From
the free entry condition U 0(c)q = gEffi0, we get the elasticity of cash consumption to the money
injection for a constrained agent as  "qh;1+$ = ("U 0(c);qh + 1)
 1. Then, from (13),
"
U 0(c)ffi;fEffi0 = d lnU 0(c)ffid lngEffi0 =

p+ i
1 + i
(1  ff)

1
"U 0(c);qh + 1
+
1  p
1 + i
: (20)
This gives elasticity of consumption velocity with respect to future value of money as
"
Vc;fEffi0 = sc
(h
 
1
ff
+ 1

"U 0(c);qh  
p+ i
1 + i
(1  ff)
i 1
"U 0(c);qh + 1
 
1  p
1 + i
)
  scash;nb
1
"U 0(c);qh + 1
:
From this and (20), we nd (19). A detailed proof is in appendix B.3. 
16Capital uctuations remain an important ingredient of the computed model below.
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Note that the only dierence between (20) and (14) is the term ("U 0(c);qh + 1)
 1, which captures
the general equilibrium feedback between qh and c, taking into account the optimal labor supply
decision. As less is sold in the retail market, less has to be produced in the labor market. This
improves marginal productivity of labor and raises credit consumption. As before, in equation
(20), if p = 1, we would need ff < 1 to get a positive sign for the autocorrelations of prices, real
money stock and interest rates, and again, this constraint is relaxed if p < 1.
In (19), we recognize the dierent channels through which idiosyncratic uncertainty works: (i)
credit market eects through the leftmost term; (ii) cash market channel through the right-side
(1 + i)=(p + i) term; and (iii) the general equilibrium substitution channel, through "U 0(c);qh . We
show these components graphically as a function of ff, in gure 1. We see that idiosyncratic shocks
raise the elasticity of velocity with respect to interest rates dramatically, as signied by the vertical
dierence between the grey dashed and black dashed lines in the graph, and allow for a positive
elasticity for a much larger range of ff (here presented with p = 0:5). We also observe, in the
dierence between the top dotted line and the top solid line, that the general equilibrium eect
is small, but works to raise the elasticity of velocity with respect to the nominal interest rate.
Keeping the size of the cash market the same, and lowering p, it can be shown that the sensitivity
of velocity to interest rates through the cash market channel is raised.
4 Calibration
The model period is a quarter. We choose a CES form of the utility function:
U(c; q) =

(c + (1  )#q)
1

1 ff
1  ff
(21)
We will calibrate the model both with this function, and with the separable form that we used
in most of our analytical work, which is a special case of the CES form. In that case, we use
U(c) = c
1 ff
1 ff and u(q) =
x1q
1 ff
1 ff . The production function is Cobb-Douglas: f(k; h) = k
h1 :
In the separable-utility case, we need to calibrate parameters , ff, A,  and  , which are
standard, as well as x1 and the process for the idiosyncratic shock #. For the CES utility, we
calibrate , the share of credit goods in the consumption mix, instead of x1, and , the parameter
that guides elasticity of substitution between cash and credit goods. Finally, the parameters of the
exogenous driving processes fg, and standard deviations ff"1 and ff"2 have to be calibrated.
We will use the M2 measure of money supply to compute the nominal moments in the data.
We make this choice to follow the literature, e.g. Hodrick et al (1991) and Wang and Shi (2006),
among others. Another reason of using this aggregate is that it exhibits much more stationarity
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over time than M1. But the most important reason for our choice is that in our micro data work,
we think of liquid payment methods as not only cash, but also checks and debit cards, which
implies inclusion in the monetary aggregate of checking accounts. In addition, we are describing
precautionary money demand, so it is intuitive that the monetary aggregate should include savings
accounts. A concern may arise that some money in M2 earns interest, which does not happen in
our model. In response to this concern, we present quantitative results for a modied version of
the model, in which we allow interest to be paid not only on bonds, but also on money that is
carried over from period to period as savings by households. Appendix C presents this modication
and the resulting equilibrium conditions.17 Notice that in this modied model, we are taking an
extreme view that the representative liquid savings earn interest; in the data, a signicant portion
of the precautionary balances are held in non-interest-paying forms like cash and checking accounts
(see Telyukova (2011)), so we are likely overstating the share of interest-bearing liquid balances.
For this version of the models, we have to change the driving process for interest rates. Details
are below. The calibration of all the model versions is in table 1.
4.1 Preference and Production Parameters
We calibrate the preference and production parameters of the model as follows.  = 0:9901 matches
the annual capital-output ratio of 3. ff = 2 is chosen within, and on the lower side of, the standard
range of [1; 4] in the literature. A is chosen each time to match aggregate labor supply of 0.3. The
capital share of output is measured in the data to give  = 0:36. Quarterly depreciation rate of
2%, consistent with estimates in the data, gives  = 0:02.
For the separable model, we calibrate the constant x1 to match the size of the retail (cash)
market. The target is 75% of total consumption in the model, consistent with the aggregate fact,
documented in Telyukova(2011), that roughly 75% of the total value of consumer transactions in
2001 took place using liquid payments methods - cash, checks, and debit cards. This number was
quoted at 82% in 1986 in Wang and Shi (2006), based on a consumer survey. We remain close to
the 2001 target.
In an alternative calibration, we chose x1 to target the average level of M2 output velocity
(Vy = 1:897) in our data sample (1984-2007, as detailed below). This results in the size of the cash
market of 50% of total consumption. The model calibrated this way produced the same dynamic
results, so we will only show them in section 5.3 for an appropriate comparison (table 7).
For the CES utility case, the parameter x1 is no longer used. The parameters  and  have to be
17We also tried the version of the model where interest is paid on all money, both within period and across periods;
the model results look very similar, so we do not present them here.
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estimated jointly, together with ff#, in an SMM procedure. For , we target the size of the cash-good
market, 75%. For the parameter , we target the interest rate elasticity of the ratio of aggregate
cash good consumption to aggregate credit good consumption. In order to construct this measure,
we use the Consumer Expenditure Survey over the period 1980-2004.18 Over the entire period,
we break household nondurable consumption items into cash goods and credit goods rst, using
the denitions discussed below for the calibration of preference shocks.19 Then using household
weights, we aggregate individual cash and credit good consumption. For the desired elasticity, we
regress the cash-to-credit log-ltered consumption ratio on the T-Bill rate. The resulting interest
rate elasticity is -1.24. The model is able to hit the targets exactly in each calibration. In the
mdel without interest-paying money,  = 0:39 implies the elasticity of substitution between the
two types of goods of 1.6.
4.2 Idiosyncratic Preference Shock Process
We pose the log of the preference shock to be i.i.d. N(0; ff#).
20 We interpret our preference shocks
as causing uctuations in household liquid consumption beyond expected (e.g. seasonal or planned)
uctuations in the data. To calibrate the process for this shock, we follow Telyukova (2011), which
estimates a similar, but persistent and monthly, process, by matching time series properties of sur-
vey data on liquid household expenditures. We use quarterly data from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX), and restrict attention to the period 2000-2002. We thus bias the target against our
model: before the mid-1990's, credit cards were not ubiquitous, so that many more goods could be
considered cash goods, resulting in a higher volatility estimate.
The key measure that we need is the unpredictable component of volatility of cash-good con-
sumption in the data. We take this component of volatility to reect optimal responses by house-
holds to unexpected preference shocks.21 We adopt this measure as a calibration target, and use
SMM to estimate the standard deviation of the shock process ff# such that standard deviation of
cash-good consumption in the model matches the data target.
The process of this measurement is described in Telyukova (2011) in detail; here we recap the
18We thank Dirk Krueger and Fabrizio Perri for providing us with the aggregated CEX data set for this period.
All the expenditure components in their data set are deated by the relevant component of the CPI.
19Clearly, in the 1980's \cash goods" in the data would have been a much broader group than the 2004 denition
we use here. However, in the absence of survey data from that period detailing which goods were and were not cash
goods, the decision of when and how to change the denition over time becomes arbitrary. Instead, we choose the
conservative approach of keeping the denition constant.
20Because of quasilinearity and credit markets in our setting, a shock process of the form #0 = #"0 with  > 0
would not change aggregate implications of our model, as can be shown from the rst-order conditions of the problem.
21The preference shocks reect any situation from being locked out of one's house to a signicant household repair
that requires payment by cash or check, e.g. In these situations, not having the money to meet the expense is very
costly, which is well captured by a parameter that shifts (marginal) utility.
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essentials. The rst step is to separate out cash goods in the CEX data. As our measure, based
on the American Bankers Association's 2004 survey of consumer payment methods, we use the
following group: food, alcohol, tobacco, rents, mortgages, utilities, household repairs, childcare
expenses, other household operations, property taxes, insurance, public transportation, and health
insurance. Even in 2004, consumers reported paying for these types of goods with liquid assets
(primarily cash and check) in 90% or more of transactions. This proportion would clearly be higher
over our longer period of inquiry, 1984-2007. This measure is also conservative, along some other
dimensions, from the standpoint of measuring unexpected expenses. First, volatility of expenses
could be driven by seasonality (e.g. Christmas gift shopping), and to control for that in part, we
remove any expenses reported as gifts; below we also remove seasonality in our regression analysis.
Second, the cash-good category excludes many situations that may be reections of emergencies
that require liquid payment, such as an emergency purchase of (or downpayment on) a durable to
replace - rather than repair - a broken durable, such as a car or an appliance. Similarly, medical
payments, which include co-pays or other out-of-pocket expenses, some of which are unpredictable
and may require a liquid payment - are not included either; the decision here was driven by the fact
that medical expenses may be payable by credit card today, even though historically this would
not be the case. Thus, in measuring the volatility of cash-good consumption, using a lot of the
\smooth" good categories while excluding many that may reect other types of emergencies besides
repairs, may understate the measurement of the uncertainty that households face, against which
they may hold liquid assets.
Using the above denition of cash goods, we estimate the following xed-eect model with
AR(1) innovations on liquid-consumption series, in order to extract the idiosyncratic shock:
log(c
liq
it ) = Xit + ui + "it (22)
"it = "i;t 1 + it:
The vector X includes, depending on specication, household observables, such as age (a cu-
bic), education, marital status, race, earnings, family size, homeownership status, as well as a set
of month and year dummies. Several specications including dierent sets of these observables all
produced nearly identical results. ui is the household xed eect. The residual "it is the idiosyn-
cratic component of liquid consumption, and it further consists of a persistent component and a
transitory component. Since our preference shock is assumed to be i.i.d., we consider the autore-
gressive component above as predictable, and the innovation it as reecting household response
to the preference shocks. Table 2 presents the standard deviation of it based on our benchmark
cash-good measure above, as well as two alternatives that exclude some of the more predictable
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expense groups. We will take the benchmark standard deviation of 19.6% to do our estimation in
the model, clearly the most conservative measure.
The estimate of the standard deviation of the log-preference shock that results from our SMM
procedure is ff# = 0:4045 in the separable model, and 0:2042 in the CES model, where in the latter
case, the parameter is estimated jointly with  and . The values adjust slightly if we incorporate
interest payments on money savings. We discretize our i.i.d. shock with 5 discrete shock states
using the Tauchen (1986) method, with shocks at maximum two standard deviations away from
their mean.22 Finally, to convince the reader that we do not overstate the amount of uncertainty
in expenses through our shock calibration, we plot in gure 2 the steady-state distribution of the
log of liquid consumption in the model, and compare it to the empirical distribution of the log-
consumption residual (it), with bins centered at the same states as in the model. It is key for the
quantitative performance of the model that we capture the probability of binding shocks correctly;
in our 5-state calibration, this is reected in the top consumption state, as only the top shock binds
in our calibrated equilibrium. From the gure, it is apparent that our calibration captures this
probability accurately.
4.3 Aggregate Shock Processes
Finally, we calibrate technology and monetary policy shocks. We model these as two separate
processes, as described above. Fort the model with no interest paid on money, we estimate in our
data sample the following two regressions:
zt = zzzt 1 + "1
ln

1 + it
1 +i

= ii ln

1 + it 1
1 +i

+ i ln

1 + t 1
1 + 

+ iy ln

yt 1
y

+ "2
zt is the Solow residual measured in the standard way, and we take out the linear trend from
both the Solow residual and the output series. The variables with bars capture long-term averages
of the respective variables in our sample period, 1984-2007, as is standard in estimating central
banks' targets in policy rules. Our choice of years captures the period when the Federal Reserve is
thought to have used (implicit) ination targeting. Notice that our interest rate rule depends on
endogenous variables. We choose the Federal Funds rate as the measure of interest rates.
For the model with interest-paying money, denote by R the ratio 1+i
m
1+ib
, where im is the interest
rate paid on money, and ib is the interest rate on bonds. We change the second equation above to
22We also computed the model with 11 discrete shock states, and found the results to be robust.
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the following system, which we estimate by VAR, using M2 own interest rate for im:
ln
 
1 + ibt
1 + ib
!
= ii ln
 
1 + ibt 1
1 + ib
!
+ i ln

1 + t 1
1 + 

+ iy ln

yt 1
y

+ "2
ln

Rt
R

= rr ln

Rt 1
R

+ ri ln
 
1 + ibt 1
1 + ib
!
+ r ln

1 + t 1
1 + 

+ ry ln

yt 1
y

+ "3:
5 Results
5.1 The Role of Precautionary Money Demand
To highlight the quantitative role of precautionary demand for money, we compute, in addition
to the four versions of our model described above, a version of the separable benchmark with
the preference shocks shut down. Specically, in this version, we assign to everyone the highest
preference shock with probability 1; this means that everyone's cash constraint always binds. We
refer to this version of the model as the \no-shock model"; it closely replicates standard cash-credit
good models with only aggregate risk. The computational method is in Appendix D.
Table 3 summarizes the dynamic properties of some key nominal variables. The rst column of
the table presents moment in the data. The second column presents the results for the no-shock
model. The last four columns show the results in our model with separable and CES utility, with
and without interest-paying money. Notice that we are not targeting any of our result moments in
calibration, so that the model is left free in terms of its dynamic performance.
As is clear from the table, for any model version, precautionary motive for holding money makes
a dramatic dierence for the performance of the model: without it, the model is not able to capture
almost any of the moments in the data, while introducing precautionary demand makes the model
align quite successfully on nearly all of the dimensions listed. When we do not target mean output
velocity, we underpredict the level of both velocity measures. In our model, as in other monetary
business cycle models, money turns over only once a quarter, so it is not surprising that the level is
not high enough. It is also not surprising that in the no-shock model, mean velocity is higher than
in the model with shocks; when the cash constraint is always binding, the cash market contributes
exactly 1 to velocity level every period. In the model with shocks, that contribution is less than 1
for all the non-binding shock realizations; all but 7% of the households do not spend all of their
money, and hence contribute less than 1 to velocity. If we target the level of velocity instead, we
are able to match the levels very well without aecting the rest of the moments presented here.
(See table 7).
Focusing on the models without interest-bearing money, in terms of volatility of velocity, as
our analytical results suggested, we do much better in the model with the preference shocks than
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in the model without. Even with our relatively low risk aversion parameter (a parameter that
needed to be high in both Hodrick et al (1991) and Wang and Shi (2006) to begin to get signicant
velocity volatility), the model with the preference uncertainty gets close to the data in terms of the
volatility of velocity. For output velocity, the separable model with the preference shocks produces
40% higher volatility than the no-shock model; for consumption velocity, the benchmark produces
60 times the volatility of the no-shock model. As discussed in our theory section, the reason is that
with the introduction of preference shocks, the cash market contributes signicantly to volatility
of velocity, whereas it would contribute nothing if the cash constraint were always binding. Notice
also that in the model with precautionary demand, we get the proportion of consumption velocity
to output velocity volatility right, while it is very far o target in the no-shock model. Since
consumption velocity is the major component of output velocity, consumption expenditure being
75% of GDP, the no-shock model is an unsatisfying theory of velocity dynamics because these
dynamics come from the wrong source in that model.
Due to the properties of our exogenous driving process, we overpredict output volatility slightly
and equally in both the benchmark and the no-shock model. The latter, however, underpredicts
volatility of velocity substantially, leading us to conclude that the overprediction of output volatility
is immaterial in creating excess velocity volatility.
Continuing down the list, the model with preference shocks replicates most moments very well,
and much better than the model without shocks. As we analyzed in the model section, we expect
that for RRA parameter ff > 1, as it is here, the correlation of velocity with nominal interest rates,
and its elasticity, will be negative in the no-shock model, counter to the data. The relevant rows
in the table conrm this. Instead, with the preference shocks, the relationship between velocity
and nominal interest rates has the correct sign and magnitude. The correlations of output with
growth of output and consumption also ip signs relative to data if the model has no idiosyncratic
preference risk; with the shocks, the signs are correct, and the magnitudes are close to the data for
the most part.
The CES and separable models produce almost the same results with respect to the above
moments; in the CES case, we even overpredict volatility of velocity by a bit. If we modify
the model to add interest-bearing money, the results are generally robust, in that it is still clear
that precautionary demand for money makes a crucial dierence relative to the no-shock case.
The presence of interest payment on money reduces model volatility of velocity, and elasticity of
velocity with respect to the bond interest rate, particularly in the separable model. This is not
surprising: for unconstrained households, consumption in the cash market now responds to the
movement not of the bond interest rate, but to the ratio of bond-to-money interest rates, which
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dampens the response of cash consumption. In addition, since, as we mentioned before, we are
making an extreme assumption that all precautionary balances earn interest, our model likely
presents the lower bound on volatility of velocity. Notice however, that with CES and interest-
bearing money, we recover most of the volatility properties, as well as other dynamic properties,
of the benchmark without interest-bearing money; in some dimensions, the model's performance
even improves relative to data. We view this as a strong endorsement for the role of precautionary
demand for money: not only does the model do well along the standard dimensions in the literature,
where typically money is not modeled as interest-bearing and iscalibrated to M2, but our model
passes an even higher bar of introducing interest-bearing money.
Table 4 presents the dynamic behavior of real balances (M=P ), as well as the autocorrelations
of velocity, ination and real balances. These moments, all close to the data in the benchmark
model, show that velocity volatility does not come from excessive volatility in the value of the
money stock or from volatility at the wrong frequency. Note also that in the no-shock model,
volatility of real balances is extremely low relative to the data, again implying that it is unable to
reproduce dynamics of the sources of velocity uctuations.
5.2 Some Other Aggregate Facts
We now assess the performance of our model according to an additional set of facts, listed by Cooley
and Hansen (CH, 1995) as some of the more signicant monetary features of business cycles. A rst
set of these facts is presented in table 5. The rst ve columns list the performance of our model
against the data, while the last two show the comparable moments from the CH data sample and
model. The facts are that velocity is procyclical, prices are countercyclical, and that correlation
of output and ination with the growth of money supply is negative, with the latter being small.
We match these facts in the model and get the magnitudes of the correlations about right. The
correlation of money growth and ination is the only fact that is aected by introduction of interest-
bearing money: the sign reverses, although in the CES case, the magnitude approaches zero. Even
with this reversal, our model performs better than the CH model on all dimensions. Appendix E
shows additional dynamic results from the model via cross-correlations of some real and nominal
variables with output.
Finally, we want to highlight some aspects of the data that we are not so successful in capturing.
As is clear from table 6, our model, as the previous models in its class, misses the liquidity eect, i.e.
the negative correlation of nominal interest rates with money growth, and prices and ination are
too exible relative to data. All the versions of our model get these moments wrong in a similar way.
The CH cash-in-advance model is again presented as a point of comparison and similarly misses
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these moments. In general, it is not surprising we miss the liquidity eect, since our model lacks
any rigidity in price adjustment. Sluggish adjustment of prices, as for example in Alvarez, Atkeson
and Edmond (2008), is dicult to incorporate without a mechanism like market segmentation. We
do not target this mechanism and hence did not expect to get the liquidity eect right.
5.3 Pitfalls of Calibration without Precautionary Demand
If precautionary demand for money is omitted from the model, the standard practice of calibrat-
ing monetary models to aggregate money demand, which may have a signicant precautionary
component, would likely produce misleading parameter values and thus aect the quantitative per-
formance of the model. To demonstrate this here, we perform the following test. We take, again, a
version of our separable benchmark model with the preference shocks shut down, so that the cash
constraint always binds. But instead of xing the calibration to the benchmark, as we did above,
we will now calibrate the model to two standard targets in the monetary literature: the expected
value of velocity, E(Vy), and the elasticity of inverse velocity with respect to the nominal interest
rate,  "V;1+i. This exercise produces dierent values for parameters x1 (0.51), A (3.1) and, most
importantly, the RRA parameter ff. The model without preference shocks can only reproduce the
monetary targets with the value of ff = 0:15.23 This is not surprising: we showed analytically that
the no-shock model cannot get the sign of the elasticity of velocity with respect to nominal interest
rates right unless ff < 1.
The dynamic properties of this model are presented in table 7, where we compare our separable
model, now calibrated to match E(Vy), with the no-shock model with the same target. Even when
targeting E(V ) and "V;1+i, the no-shock model does badly along other nominal dimensions, even
for the same moments of consumption velocity, and now the quantitative implications on the
real side of the model suer noticeably as well. For instance, here the no-shock model doubles
volatility of output, consumption and investment relative to data, while the benchmark gets these
standard deviation measures fairly close to the data. In other words, even if we were willing to
accept the calibrated parameters that this exercise requires, the results that the model produces
are far inferior to the performance of our benchmark with preference shocks. This is true along
both nominal and real dimensions, even though the model is rigged, in how it is parameterized, to
do well quantitatively on the nominal side. Modeling precautionary demand for money solves this
problem.
With a CES utility, we can derive the value of the parameter  needed in order to match the
23Values of ff very close to this commonly arise in monetary models without precautionary money demand, from
sticky-price models (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997) to monetary search models (Lagos and Wright, 2005).
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target "Vc;1+i = 4:15, as described in the above subsection. First, we can show that the elasticity
of consumption velocity with respect to the nominal interest rate in this version of the model is
given by "Vc;1+i  scr
c
c+q

1   4:15. With credit consumption c=(c+ q) measuring at 47% of total
consumption, as was the case to target the expected level of consumption velocity, this expression
implies the parameter  = 0:915. If we target the credit consumption share of 25%, as in the SMM
procedure described before, then we derive  = 0:94. These values of parameters imply elasticity
of substitution between cash and credit goods of 11.8 and 20, respectively, for the CES model with
no preference shocks to match the elasticity target.
But the model with no preference shocks also gives a closed-form implication for the parameter
, so that we can estimate it in the data directly. The model with CES utility implies the marginal
rate of substitution between cash and credit goods given by1 

  q
c
 1
= 1 + i. Taking logs and
rearranging, we can estimate  by running the following regression:
log

q
c

=   log

1  


1
   1
+
1
   1
log(1 + i):
Based on logged and detrended data that we used before, we get  = 0:85, which implies the
elasticity of substitution between the two goods of 6.8. Thus the data targets once again prove
impossible to match using the model with no precautionary demand.
All of this is suggests that omitting precautionary money demand from monetary models may
produce inaccurate results in not only matching data facts, but also conducting policy experiments
and drawing normative conclusions.
6 Welfare Costs of Inflation
6.1 Inflation Level
As we discussed above, in a model without precautionary demand for money, all agents bear the
ination tax equally: it comes from the wedge in the marginal rate of substitution between the cash
and credit good created by the nominal interest rate. In our model with idiosyncratic risk, changes
in steady state ination distort cash-good consumption only for the binding shock realizations,
but the constrained households value this consumption more than average, and are therefore more
sensitive to these distortions. Relative to a model without precautionary demand, the rst channel
would diminish the welfare cost of ination, because not all agents bear it, while the second would
increase it for the constrained agents. Comparing steady states, we calculate the welfare cost of
ination as the percentage reduction in consumption under the Friedman Rule that would make
a household indierent between the Friedman Rule and a higher-ination state. This measure is
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1 , with FR denoting ination at the Friedman Rule:
U(c(FR)) + E[#u(q#(FR))]  Ah(FR) = U(c()) + E[#u(q#())]  Ah();
We solve for , and derive the steady state quantities in closed form (see appendix F). The dashed
(red) line in panel(a) of gure 3 is the welfare cost of ination in the no-shock model; the solid (blue)
line is the cost of welfare in the model with idiosyncratic shocks. First, the welfare cost of 10%
yearly ination, relative to the Friedman rule, is 0.2% of the ecient level of consumption in the
no-shock model, but is more than twice that, 0.5%, in our benchmark model with idiosyncratic risk.
These results are slightly lower than in the literature, because the standard welfare computation
does not include the decrease in disutility of labor when cash-good consumption declines with
ination.24
Second, the dierence between the two lines is increasing with the level of annual ination. This
is because not only the cost of ination increases for a given constrained agent as ination rises,
but in addition, the proportion of constrained agents increases with ination. At 100% ination,
where in our benchmark model close to 30% of households are constrained, compared to only 7%
at ination rates below 9%, the welfare cost in the no-shock model is 1.6%, while in the model
with shocks, it is 2.8%. Thus, a model with a full distribution of idiosyncratic shocks allows us to
give a better approximation of welfare costs at high levels of ination than models in which the
cash constraints always binds, and in which the share of consumption subject to this constraint is
calibrated using velocity in low-ination data. In our steady state comparison, the underestimate
of welfare costs in the no-shock model is increasing over a large range of ination (at least up to
an annual ination of 1200%), and is relatively stable afterwards.
6.2 Inflation Uncertainty
In the benchmark model, there is no uncertainty about ination within a period: the current
aggregate state is revealed at the beginning of the period, households make their decisions on
how much money to hold, and rms set supply of the cash good, knowing the value of money,
and hence the cash-good price, in advance. We can modify the timing of the model, however, to
introduce ination \surprises", so that households and rms make their credit-market decisions
before they know the second-subperiod price level. In our setting, we modify the benchmark to
allow households to nd out the aggregate state of the economy for period t + 1 at the start of
subperiod 2 of t. The information structure in this model is meant to be comparable to Svensson
24Without accounting for the labor disutility, the welfare cost of 10% ination in the model with shocks, compared
with the Friedman rule, is 1.58% of the ecient level of consumption, and about 1.2% of output. These numbers are
0.5% in Cooley and Hansen (1989), and 1.5% Lucas (2000) and 1.6% in Lagos and Wright (2005)
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(1985); the details are in appendix G.
This timing adjustment adds a distortion from increases in ination, because the cash-good
price  t will adjust mid-period to the information regarding next period's aggregate state. Now
retail rms decide on how much good qt to take out of the credit market, and households choose
money holdings, before they know  t. Suppose that households observe that ination will be higher
than expected, implying lower value of money ffit+1. The constrained households cannot increase
their cash-good consumption, and can buy less in the high-shock state than they expected before.
However, the supply of the cash good is xed from the credit market, and the shortfall of demand
from constrained households has to be made up by demand from unconstrained households. This
means that relative to a case without unexpected ination, the MRS of a constrained household
will increase as its consumption will decline, while that of an unconstrained household will be
lower than 1, so the distortion between the two types of households is exacerbated by unexpected
ination changes. Thus, an unexpected increase in ination would decrease welfare by a larger
amount than an unexpected increase, because q cannot adjust. As a result, a mean-preserving
increase in the variance of ination shocks can lower ex-ante welfare in this version of the model,
whereas it would have no impact in the model with no ination surprises. As panel (b) of gure
3 shows, welfare cost of ination uncertainty accelerates as the standard deviation of log-ination
increases; the welfare cost of 10% standard deviation of ination is just below 2.5% of consumption.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the aggregate implications of precautionary demand for money. We highlight
the importance of modeling uninsurable idiosyncratic risk in preferences as a cause of precaution-
ary motive for holding liquidity. By incorporating this idiosyncratic risk into a standard monetary
model with aggregate risk, and by carefully calibrating the idiosyncratic shocks to data, we nd
that the model matches many dynamic moments of nominal variables well, and greatly improves
on the performance of existing monetary models that do not incorporate such idiosyncratic shocks.
We show also that omitting precautionary demand while targeting, in calibration, data properties
of money demand { a standard calibration practice { produces inferior performance in terms of
matching the data, potentially misleading implications for parameters of the model, and an un-
derstatement of welfare costs of ination, and may therefore adversely aect the model's policy
implications as well.
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Figure 1: Contributions of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty to Interest Rate Elasticity of Velocity
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Figure 2: Distribution of Log-Consumpion of Cash Goods, Data vs. Model Discretization
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Separable CES Separable CES
with im with im
 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
ff 2 2 2 2
A 34 5 34 5
x1 6 { 6.33 {
 { 0.33 { 0.33
 { 0.39 { 0.43
 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
ff# 0.41 0.20 0.39 0.21
zz 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
ii 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
i 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12
iy 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
rr { { 0.89 0.89
rr { { 0.01 0.01
ry { { -0.006 -0.006
r { { -0.05 -0.05
ff"1 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
ff"2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ff"3 { { 0.0007 0.0007
ff"2;"3 { {  7 10
 7  7 10 7
\Separable" { benchmark model with separable utility; \CES" - bench-
mark with CES utility. \With im" is the version of the model with
interest-bearing money.
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Table 2: Unpredictable Volatility of Liquid Consumption, Quarterly CEX Data
Standard Deviation of it (%)
Benchmark 19.6
Excluding food 27.5
Excluding food and property taxes 29.4
Standard deviation, converted into percent, of the transitory component of the residual of
the regression of log-cash good consumption on household characteristics, CEX 2000-2002.
See equation (22).
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Table 3: Dynamic Properties of the Model
Moment Data No-Shock Separable CES Separable CES
Model with im with im
E(Vy) 1.897 1.812 1.357 1.339 1.293 1.248
E(Vc) 1.120 1.380 1.033 1.020 0.984 0.950
ff(Vy) 0.017 0.010 0.014 0.021 0.011 0.013
ff(Vc) 0.014 0.0002 0.012 0.019 0.006 0.009
ff(y) 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
ff(1 + ib) 0.0026 0.001 0.002 0.0025 0.002 0.002
corr(Vy; y) 0.638 0.993 0.585 0.386 0.817 0.684
corr(Vy; gy) 0.059 0.289 0.142 0.078 0.217 0.159
corr(Vc; gy) -0.094 0.110 -0.071 -0.065 -0.074 -0.084
corr(Vy; gc) 0.127 0.539 0.233 0.109 0.242 0.464
corr(Vc; gc) -0.027 0.176 -0.155 -0.148 -0.128 -0.134
corr(Vy; 1 + i
b) 0.714 -0.210 0.645 0. 558 0.390 0.585
corr(Vc; 1 + i
b) 0.690 -0.896 0.897 0.648 0.912 0.915
"Vy ;1+ib 5.072 -1.747 4.546 4.744 2.542 4.115
"Vc;1+ib 4.158 -0.123 5.072 5.046 3.363 4.653
corr(1 + ; 1 + ib) 0.529 0.768 0.361 -0.032 0.572 0.465
All data logged and BP ltered. Data period: 1984-2007. Velocity moments calculated based on M2.
Bond interest rate is the Fed Funds rate. Ination measured based on GDP deator. gy refers to output
growth. \Separable" { benchmark model with separable utility; \CES" - benchmark with CES utility.
\With im" is the version of the model with interest-bearing money. \No-Shock" model is the version of
the separable model with idiosyncratic preference shocks shut down.
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Table 4: Properties of Velocity Volatility
Moment Data No-Shock Separable CES Separable CES
Model with im with im
ff(M=P ) 0.013 0.003 0.012 0.018 0.007 0.010
corr(Vy; Vy; 1) 0.941 0.898 0.898 0.902 0.901 0.903
corr(Vc; Vc; 1) 0.937 0.896 0.898 0.902 0.911 0.911
corr(;  1) 0.901 0.870 0.844 0.840 0.864 0.851
corr(M=P;M=P 1) 0.944 0.921 0.898 0.901 0.908 0.908
All data logged and BP ltered. Data period: 1984-2007. Velocity and money supply moments
calculated based on M2. Ination measured based on GDP deator. \Separable" { benchmark model
with separable utility; \CES" - benchmark with CES utility. \With im" is the version of the model with
interest-bearing money. \No-Shock" model is the version of the separable model with idiosyncratic
preference shocks shut down.
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Table 5: More Monetary Business Cycle Facts
Moment Data Sep. CES Sep. + im CES + im CH data CH
corr(V; y) 0.64 0.58 0.39 0.82 0.68 0.37 0.948
corr(p; y) -0.13 -0.28 -0.10 -0.26 -0.28 -0.57 -0.22
corr(gm; y) -0.11 -0.15 -0.10 -0.27 -0.25 -0.12 -0.01
corr(gm; ) -0.06 -0.13 -0.40 0.38 0.07 -0.29 0.92
All data logged and BP ltered. Data period: 1984-2007. Velocity moments calculated based on
M2. Ination and prices measured based on GDP deator. gm refers to money supply growth.
\Separable" { benchmark model with separable utility; \CES" - benchmark with CES utility.
\With im" is the version of the model with interest-bearing money.
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Table 6: Liquidity Eect
Moment Data Separable CH data CH
Model Model
corr(gm; i) -0.7(M1)/0.07(M2) 0.79 -0.27 0.72
corr(y; i) 0.54 -0.13 0.40 -0.01
corr(y; ) 0.37 -0.25 0.34 -0.14
corr(gm; p) 0.03 0.61 -0.16 0.43
All data logged and BP ltered. Data period: 1984-2007. Money supply moments
calculated based on M2. Bond interest rate is the Fed Funds rate. Ination
measured based on GDP deator. gm refers to money supply growth. \Separable"
{ benchmark model with separable utility.
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Table 7: No-Shock Model Targeting Money Demand in the Data, Separable Utility
Moment Data Separable No-Shock Model
(Target E(Vy)) (Target Money Demand)
E(Vy) 1.897 1.898 1.895
E(Vc) 1.120 1.445 1.442
ff(Vy) 0.017 0.014 0.028
ff(Vc) 0.014 0.011 0.003
ff(y) 0.009 0.012 0.022
ff(c) 0.005 0.003 0.012
ff(inv) 0.050 0.044 0.114
ff(1 + i) 0.0026 0.002 0.002
corr(Vy; y) 0.638 0.602 0.905
corr(Vy; gy) 0.059 0.145 0.411
corr(Vc; gy) -0.094 -0.070 -0.185
corr(Vy; gc) 0.127 0.262 0.323
corr(Vc; gc) -0.027 -0.139 0.256
corr(Vy; 1 + i) 0.714 0.638 0.333
corr(Vc; 1 + i) 0.690 0.897 0.999
"Vy ;1+i 5.072 4.469 5.030
"Vc;1+i 4.158 4.994 1.763
corr(1 + ; 1 + i) 0.529 0.358 0.657
RRA ff 2.0 0.15
All data logged and BP ltered. Data period: 1984-2007. Velocity moments calculated
based on M2. Bond interest rate is the Fed Funds rate. Ination measured based on
GDP deator. gy refers to output growth. Benchmark: separable model, calibrated to
target E(Vy). \No-Shock" model is the version of the separable model with idiosyncratic
preference shocks shut down. Bolded quantities represent calibration targets. RRA ff is
the value of the relative risk aversion parameter needed in calibration in order to match
the targets.
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A APPENDIX: Analysis of Household Problem
A.1 Walrasian Market creates Homogeneity
For general utility functions, dierent realizations of the idiosyncratic preference shock would lead
to a nontrivial distribution of wealth (with, for example, those who have recently experienced a
sequence of high #s now being poorer on average). In turn, households with dierent wealth could
make dierent portfolio decisions, and hence the distribution across individual state variables would
be relevant for equilibrium prices.
However, the quasi-linear specication of the problem allows equilibria in which all heterogeneity
created in the second subperiod washes out in the credit market.25 This occurs if the boundary
conditions of h are never hit, which we assume to be the relevant case below. Our quantitative
strategy later is to solve the problem assuming that the optimal choice of h is interior, and check
in our calibrated equilibrium whether this is indeed the case.
After substituting the budget constraint for h into the household's value function, we can split
the value function in two parts:
V (s; S) =A

ffim+ (1 + r   )k + ffib(1 + i 1)
w

+max
:::
(
U(c)  A

c+ ffi ~m+ k0 + ffib0
w

+ E#

#u(q#) + Ez0;i0 [V (s
0; S0)]
)
: (23)
From this, Result 1 is immediate, under the assumption of interiority on h.
Household wealth diers at the beginning of the Walrasian market, due to heterogeneous trading
histories in the previous cash market, but households adjust their hours worked to be able to get
the same amount of c; ~m;k0; b0. The value function V (:) is dierentiable in k;m; b, and the envelope
conditions are independent of the individual state variables. Hence, the expectation over # does
not matter for intertemporal choice variables, for example:
E#[Ez0;i0Vm(s; S)] = Ez0;i0Vm(s; S) = Ez0;i0

Affi(S)
w(S)

:
The problem is weakly concave in capital, labor and bond holdings, and the solution is interior,
as long as h is interior. The rst-order condition with respect to credit-good consumption, and the
Euler equations with respect to capital and bonds, thus look as follows:
25This result has been used extensively in models that combine Walrasian markets with bilateral trade and id-
iosyncratic matching risk, such as Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Here we use it to
combine Walrasian markets with cash markets and idiosyncratic preference risk.
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U 0(c(S)) =
A
w(S)
(24)
U 0(c(S)) = Ez0;i0 [U
0(c(S0))(1 + r(S0)  )] (25)
ffiU 0(c(S)) = Ez0;i0
h ffi0
1 +$
U 0(c(S0))
i
(1 + i) (26)
For future reference, we introduce the following notation, using marginal utilities dened in terms
of the marginal productivity of labor (24):
E

U 0(c0)
U 0(c)

 eE; E ffi0(S0)
1 +$
U 0(c0)
U 0(c)

 gEffi0:
A.2 The Choice of Money Holdings and Cash Market Consumption
Denote by P(#) the probability of a particular shock # occurring. Taking as given (25)-(26), the
rst-order conditions with respect to ~m and q# give
P(#)

#u0(q#)
U 0(c)
  1

   
#
U 0(c)
= 0 (27)
 ffi+
X
#
#
U 0(c)
+ gEffi0 = 0; (28)
with the appropriate complementary slackness conditions (see equilibrium conditions below). It is
immediate that in this model cash balances are not spent in full for realizations of # that are low
enough. Since a social planner would equate U 0(c) to #u0(q#), the following conclusions can be
drawn:
Result 2. If a shock # results in a nonbinding constraint, then q# is the ecient quantity.
Moreover, as long as the cash constraint does not bind, the quantity q# does not respond to
the interest rate.
Moreover, also observe that if some #^ leads to a binding constraint, then for every # > #^, the
cash constraint will bind. If #^ leads to a slack cash constraint, any # < #^ will lead to a nonbinding
constraint. A binding cash constraint leads to underconsumption of the cash good relative to the
social optimum.
A.3 Equilibrium Conditions
We summarize the above discussion in the system of rst-order conditions and Euler equations
that characterize the equilibrium of the problem:
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U 0(c) = E[U 0(c0)(1 + r0   )] (29)
U 0(c) =
A
w
 =
1 + i
ffi
#
U 0(c)
= P(#)

#u0(q#)
U 0(c) 
 
ffi
1 + i

; #( ~m   q#) = 0 8#
ffi =
P
# #
U 0(c)
+
ffi
1 + i
ffi
1 + i
= gEffi0
y + (1  )k = c+ k0 +
X
#
P(#)q#
z0 = zzz + "
0
1
(1^ + i0) = ii(]1 + i) + i~ + iy ~y + "
0
2
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B Proofs of Analytical Results: Idiosyncratic Uncertainty and
Nominal Dynamics
B.1 Lemma 1
Proof. The derivative of ffi with respect to gEffi0, using (13), (26), the cash-market money constraint
and ~m = 1, is
dffi
d(gEffi0) = p#h(u00(gEffi0)gEffi0 + u0(gEffi0)) + (1  p)
Divide both sides by ffi=(gEffi0), and using (13), we nd
"
ffi;fEffi0 = p#h(u00(gEffi0)gEffi0 + u0(gEffi0))p#hu0(gEffi0) + (1  p) + (1  p)
gEffi0
ffi
:
Rewriting this as a function of the interest rate (ffi=gEffi0), this elasticity then becomes equation
(14). 
B.2 Lemma 2
Proof. One can derive that " 1+i
ffi
;1+i = 1  "ffi;1+i: Substituting in
"ffi;1+i =
1
"1+i;ffi
=
1
1  "
fEffi0;ffi =
"
ffi;fEffi0
"
ffi;fEffi0   1 ; (30)
we nd
" ;1+i = " 1+i
ffi
;1+i = 1  "ffi;1+i =
 1
"
ffi;fEffi0   1
Putting the last equation together with (14) yields (18). 
B.3 Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The implicit elasticity of consumption velocity with respect to the nominal
interest rate, caused by a one-time fully anticipated money injection (in addition to the
constant rate of money injection consistent with a given steady state level of 1 + i), is
"Vc;1+i = sc

1
ff
1 + i
p+ i
  1

+ scash;nb

1 + i
p+ i
 
1
"U 0(c);qh + ff
!
(31)
Proof. The elasticity of velocity with respect to a change in the interest rate (caused by a one-time
anticipated additional injection of money 1 +$) is
"Vc;1+i =
d lnVc
d ln 1 +$
. d ln 1 + i
d ln 1 +$
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Velocity is given by
Vc =
PC
M
=
c
ffi
+ (1  p)
ql(1 + i)
ffi
+ p
qh(1 + i)
ffi
;
hence,
"Vc;1+$ = sc("c;1+$   "ffi;1+$)  scash;nb"qh;1+$;
using " ;1+$ =  "qh;1+$.
Since a one-time fully anticipated money injection does not aect tomorrow's ffi or U 0(c0),
we formulate the elasticities in terms of gEffi0, which for the duration of the proof we dene asgEffi0 def= U 0(c0)ffi0=(1 +$); then "
1+$;fEffi0 =  1, and
"Vc;1+i = "Vc;fEffi0="1+i;fEffi0 :
To derive "
c;fEffi0 , let us derive how h varies with c in the equilibrium. From equation (24), the
elasticity is
"c;h =  

ff
; "U 0(c);h =  (32)
Now, from the household budget constraint, we use (32) to derive
"c;qh =  
sqh
sc +
1 

ff
; "U 0(c);qh =
sqhff
sc +
1 

ff
> 0; (33)
where sqh is the share of total output going to qh consumption, sqh = (pqh)=Y ; likewise sc = c=Y .
Moreover, "c;qh =  
1
ff
"U 0(c);qh .
26
The free entry condition now allows us to link tomorrow's value of money gEffi0 to today's
movements in qh. Free entry gives U
0(c)qh = gEffi0 (which is consistent with qh = gEffi0 in the old
denition), which means that
"
qh;fEffi0 = 1"U 0(c);qh + 1 ; (34)
leading to
"
c;fEffi0 =   "U 0(c);qhff("U 0(c);qh + 1) : (35)
To calculate "
ffi;fEffi0 , use
U 0(c)ffi = p#u0(qh)
gEffi0
U 0(c)
+ (1  p)gEffi0 = p#u0(qh)qh + (1  p)gEffi0; (36)
26Equation (33) captures the general equilibrium eect from changes in qh: a shift away from cash consumption
will lead to an increase in credit market consumption. This eect is proportional to the share of cash consumption
under the binding shock in total consumption. In case of idiosyncratic uncertainty, sqh is smaller (by a factor smaller
than p) than total cash market consumption, and hence the elasticity in equation (33) is smaller.
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derived from the FOCs of m; qh, to nd
d lnffi
d lngEffi0 = p#hu
0(qh)qh
p#hu0(qh)qh + (1  p)gEffi0 d ln(u
0(qh)qh)
d ln qh
d ln qh
dgEffi0
+
(1  p)gEffi0
p#hu0(qh)qh + (1  p)gEffi0   d lnU
0(c)
d ln qh
d ln qh
d lngEffi0 ; (37)
Combining (37) and (36), we nd
"
ffi;fEffi0 =

p+ i
1 + i
(1  ff)  "U 0(c);qh

1
"U 0(c);qh + 1
+
1  p
1 + i
: (38)
Likewise, we can calculate
"
U 0(c)ffi;fEffi0 = d lnU 0(c)ffid lnU 0(c0)ffi0 =

p+ i
1 + i
(1  ff)

1
"U 0(c);qh + 1
+
1  p
1 + i
: (39)
With "
fEffi0;1+i = ("U 0(c)ffi;fEffi0   1) 1 and "U 0(c)ffi;fEffi0 from (39), we nd
"
1+i;fEffi0 =  
 
1 + i
p+ i

"U 0(c);qh + 1
"U 0(c);qh + ff
!
: (40)
Now we are able to calculate the elasticity of velocity with respect to gEffi0.
"
Vc;fEffi0 = d lnVcd lngEffi0 =   d lnVd ln 1 +$ =  "Vc;1+$ = sc
 d ln c
d lngEffi0   d lnffid lngEffi0

+ scash;nb
d ln 
d lngEffi0 (41)
= sc
 
 
1
ff
+ 1

"U 0(c);qh  
p+ i
1 + i
(1  ff)
 1
"U 0(c);qh + 1
 
1  p
1 + i
!
  scash;nb
1
"u0(c);qh + 1
:
From (41) it follows that, for p = 1, this elasticity is negative if ff < 1; for p < 1, a larger ff will
also lead to a negative elasticity. Combining (40) and (41) yields
"Vc;1+i =
 
1 + i
p+ i

"U 0(c);qh + 1
"U 0(c);qh + ff
!
 (42)

sc
(
1
ff
  1

"U 0(c);qh +
p+ i
1 + i
(1  ff)

1
"U 0(c);qh + 1
+
1  p
1 + i
)
+ scash;nb
1
"u0(c);qh + 1

;
which simplies to
"Vc;1+i = sc

1
ff
1 + i
p+ i
  1

+ scash;nb

1 + i
p+ i
 
1
"U 0(c);qh + ff
!
(43)

45
C A Version of the Model with Interest-Paying Money
We modify our benchmark model by introducing interest payment on money balances carried over
from period to period. Thus, we are introducing interest payment on liquid savings. (We have
also tried a version where all money is interest-bearing, even within the period; the quantitative
implications of that model are similar, but this version is a more natural counterpart of savings
accounts in the data, since short-term liquid balances, carried in cash or checking accounts, are not
typically interest-bearing.)
Denote by im the interest rate paid on money; the nominal interest rate on bonds becomes ib.
The aggregate state variables become S = (z; im 1; i
b
 1; i
m; ib; (1+$ 1)ffi 1). Firm problem remains
the same. Given this, we have the household problem as follows, where only the budget constraint
and the exogenous shock processes are aected:
V (k;m; b;S) = max
c;h; ~m;k0;b0;fq#g

U(c)  Ah (44)
+ E#

#u(q#) + Ez0;i0V (k
0;m0;
b0
1 +$
;S0)
ff
s.t. c+ ffi ~m+ k0 + ffib0 = ffim(1 + im 1) + ffib(1 + i
b
 1) + (1 + r   )k + wh (45)
 q#  ~m (46)
 =
1 + ib
ffi
(47)
 =
(1 +$ 1)ffi 1
ffi
(48)
1 +$ = 
(S) (49)
m0 =
~m
1 +$
 
 q#
1 +$
+
$
1 +$
(50)
z0 =zzz + "
0
1 (51)
(1^ + ib0) =ii(1^ + ib) + i~ + iy ~y + "
0
2 (52)0@ 1^ + im
1 + ib
1A0 =rr
0@ 1^ + im
1 + ib
1A+ ri(1^ + ib) + r~ + ry ~y + "03 (53)
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The equilibrium conditions for this version of the model are:
U 0(c) = Ez0;i0 [U
0(c0)(1 + r0   )] (54)
U 0(c) =
A
w
 =
1 + ib
ffi
#
U 0(c)
= P(#)

#u0(q#)
U 0(c) 
 
ffi(1 + im)
1 + ib

; ~#( ~m   q#) = 0 8#
ffi =
P
# #
U 0(c)
+
ffi(1 + im)
1 + ib
ffi
1 + ib
= gEffi0
y + (1  )k = c+ k0 +
X
#
P(#)q#
In terms of dynamics of the model, notice that now, the decisions of the household are often
determined not by the dynamics of the nominal bond interest rate, but of the ratio of the bond-
to-money interest rates. This is the channel which results in dampened volatilities in this version
of the mode (with separable utility). As we show in the text, the CES version of the model, even
with interest-paying money, brings the dynamics back to data levels.
D Computation Procedure
To compute the model we employ the Parameterized Expectations Approach. The method approx-
imates the expectations terms in our Euler equation system (29) - two in total - by polynomial
functions of the state variables, and the coecients of the approximation and solved for. We choose
the following forms:
E
h
(c0) ff(1 + ez
0
(k0) 1(h0)1    )
i
=  1(; ; 1) (55)
E

1
w0

=
eE
w
=  2(; 2)
where
 j(; j) = 
j
1 exp(
j
2 log k + 
j
3 log z + 
j
4 log i 1 + 
j
5 log i+ 
j
6 log[ffi 1(1 +$ 1)]):
The accuracy of approximation can be increased by raising the degree of approximating poly-
nomials above; we have experimented with several forms and found the results robust to them.
We nd that the convergence properties of our model are good: convergence is monotone and very
robust. In order to compute moments from the model, we re-run the model solution 100 times
given parameters of the model, and the simulations within each run are for 10,000 periods, where
we discard the rst 1,000 in computing the moments.
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E Cross-Correlations of Aggregate Variables with Output in Bench-
mark Model
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Figure 4: Cross-Correlations of Endogenous Variables with Output
To analyze our performance further with respect to facts highlighted by Cooley and Hansen, we
present cross-correlations of several endogenous variables with output in graphical form, in gures
4 - 6. Where possible, we also graph the cross-correlations presented by Cooley and Hansen
from their model.27 With respect to the correlations of real variables with output, we do as
well as the Cooley-Hansen model, or better. A notable improvement in our model relative to
Cooley and Hansen concerns the dynamic pattern of output velocity (bottom right panel): we
match the data for M2 velocity a lot more closely than they did. This last fact is the product of
adding precautionary demand for money into the model; we further demonstrate this in gure 5
which shows the same cross-correlations, but comparing our benchmark to our no-shock model.
In the bottom right panel, it is clear that the model with preference shocks does a lot better at
matching the data than the model without. The other three panels of that gure also show that
the improvement in dynamic patterns of real variables relative to Cooley-Hansen results in large
part from our driving processes, rather than from preference shocks: we use an interest rate rule,
while Cooley and Hansen used a money growth rule.
Finally, in gure 6 we present some further cross-correlations that we get less well. While we
get the dynamic pattern of money supply half-right (although our cross-correlation bottoms out
later than the data suggest), and we improve on Cooley and Hansen's cross-correlation of nominal
interest rates, we get neither these two, nor the dynamic patterns of prices and ination. Our
performance on the bottom two panels is fairly close to Cooley and Hansen's. Again, we do not
27Obviously, this comparison is limited in that their model is calibrated to a dierent time period; we do not
present their data for space reasons.
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Figure 5: Cross-Correlations of Endogenous Variables with Output, Benchmark vs No-Shock Model
expect to get the patterns of prices to replicate the data with a price adjustment mechanism that
is as exible and frictionless as ours.
Cross-Correlations of Money Supply with Output
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Figure 6: Cross-Correlations of Endogenous Variables with Output
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F Steady State Consumption in Closed Form
We have to solve both for credit market and cash market consumption in order to conduct the
welfare cost experiment. From the characterizing equation system (29), we get steady-state credit
market consumption, after substituting in the capital-labor ratio, from
c =
"
A
1  

1


1

  1 + 
 
1 
#  1
ff
:
To get cash market consumption we again appeal to the system (29). The issue for the welfare-
cost analysis is that as ination rate increases, more of the discrete shocks cause the cash constraint
to bind. Thus, we solve in closed form here for the general case: suppose that the total number of
discrete shock states is n and k of these shocks, from #n k+1 to #n, bind. For any binding shock,
the following system holds, given our functional forms:
#i = P(#i)
 
#ix1q
1 ff
#i
cff  
ffi
1 +i
!
8 i 2 fn  k + 1; kg
ffi =
 
1 +i
i
!
kX
i=n k+1
#i
q#i =
ffi
1 +i
8 i 2 fn  k + 1; kg:
From this, one can solve for the relevant #i , which then determine ffi, and nally q in all the
binding states, which is a function of the nominal interest rate but not of the binding shock level,
as expected. Instead, in the remaining (non-binding) states, consumption is given simply by
q#i = (#ixi)
1
ff c 8 i 2 f1; n  kg;
and is not a function of the nominal interest rate, but does change with the level of the non-binding
shock.
G A Version of the Model with Inflation Surprises
In this version of the model, we want to change the timing of agents' information. In the benchmark
model, there is no within-period aggregate uncertainty: agents nd out the aggregate state S at the
beginning of the period, and the only uncertainty they face within the period is the idiosyncratic
preference uncertainty. In this setup, ination impacts agents via its level, but its variability does
not impact rms or households. Here, we change the model by introducing within-period ination
surprises: now, we will assume that at the beginning of the cash market, households nd out not
only their preference shocks, but all agents in addition nd out the values of the next period's
monetary and productivity shocks.
We rewrite the problem, making explicit the dependence on aggregate state where necessary to
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make the changed timing clear:
V (k;m; b; S) = max
c;h; ~m;k0;b0;fq#g

U(c)  Ah (56)
+ E#;S0

#u(q#(S
0)) + ES0V (k
0;m0;
b0
1 +$
;S0)
ff
s.t. c(S) + ffi(S) ~m(S) + k0(S) + ffib0(S) = ffim+ ffib(1 + i 1) + (1 + r   )k + wh(S) (57)
E( (S0)) =
1 + i
ffi
(58)
 (S0)q#(S
0)  ~m(S) (59)
 =
(1 +$ 1)ffi 1
ffi
(60)
1 +$ = 
(S) (61)
m0 =
~m
1 +$
 
 q#
1 +$
+
$
1 +$
(62)
z0 = zzz + "
0
1 (63)
(1^ + i0) = ii(]1 + i) + i~ + iy ~y + "
0
2 (64)
The equilibrium conditions for this model are:
U 0(c) = E[U 0(c0)(1 + r0   )] (65)
U 0(c) =
A
w
E[ (S0)] =
1 + i
ffi
 (S0)
#(S
0)
U 0(c)
= P(#i; S
0jS)

#u0(q#(S
0))
U 0(c)
  E

ffi(S0) (S0)
1 +$
U 0(c0)
U 0(c)

;
#(S
0)
U 0(c)
( ~m   (S0)q#(S
0)) = 0; 8 #; S0
ffi =
X
#;S0
#(S
0)
U 0(c)
+
ffi
1 + i
ffi
1 + i
= gEffi0
q(S0) =
X
#
P(#)q#(S
0) 8 S0
y + (1  )k = c+ k0 + q(S0)
z0 = zzz + "
0
1
(1^ + i0) = ii(]1 + i) + i~ + iy ~y + "
0
2
The key change here is that now, rms decide on the amount of good q to take into the retail market,
and households on their money holdings, before they know next period's state, but consumption
in the cash market occurs after the next period's aggregate state is revealed. Suppose that agents
nd out that next period's ination will be higher. This means that, holding price of the cash good
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constant, while constrained households today cannot adjust their consumption, the unconstrained
households will want to consume strictly more. But supply of the cash good is xed, because
retailers cannot produce additional goods in the cash market. Thus, in order to clear the market,
the cash-good price  will rise in response to the ination surprise.
What does this imply for agents' welfare? With a surprise increase in ination, the constrained
agents will now have even higher marginal utility, since the price of the cash good higher, while
their money holdings are xed. The constrained agents will have lower marginal utility. Thus, the
distortion in relative marginal utilities of constrained versus unconstrained agents in this version
of the model will be even higher.
From this, we conclude that an expected change in ination will be less detrimental for welfare
than an unexpected one, because in the former case, the supply of the cash good also adjusts, while
in the latter case, this cannot happen.
In terms of the dynamics of nominal and real moments, the performance of this model is
quantitatively similar to the benchmark. In this model, velocity of money becomes more volatile
(standard deviation 2.3% versus benchmark's 1.4%), because the unconstrained agents' money
demand responds not only to the idiosyncratic shock, but also to the aggregate shock that is
realized mid-period. Other than this, however, other moments remain very close to the benchmark
dynamics.
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